Rethinking the Pakistan conundrum
The four-day military confrontation with Pakistan in May 2025 laid bare not just the operational limits of India’s conventional military strategy but also the deeper structural shift in South Asia’s security architecture. With China emerging as an unambiguous military patron of Pakistan and India’s long-held diplomatic leverage shrinking, there are new sobering realities for India to contend with.
The conflict in May, triggered by the terrorist attack in Pahalgam, was in some ways a preview of the adversary’s military capabilities. The Indian Air Force (IAF), long considered superior to its Pakistani counterpart, found itself on the defensive.
As India’s Chief of Defence Staff Anil Chauhan admitted in Singapore, the IAF was grounded for nearly two days. India’s French-made Rafales and Russian Sukhois were challenged, some downed, by Chinese-origin J-10C jets.
Backed by satellite intelligence and logistical support from Beijing, Pakistan showcased its evolving multi-domain capabilities, real-time ISR (Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance), precision missile strikes and effective air defence.
China’s support was not a one-off affair. It has fast-tracked delivery of 40 J-35A fifth-generation stealth fighters to Pakistan, with the first batch arriving later this year. Pakistan’s military is also acquiring KJ-500 AWACS aircraft and HQ-19 air defence systems. Beijing is not just exporting hardware, it is embedding its doctrine and systems into Pakistan’s military, enhancing interoperability, command structures and strategic planning.
This new phase in the China–Pakistan alliance is less about parity with India and more about overwhelming asymmetry through joint capacity-building.
Given this reality, India can no longer rely on short, punitive military strikes to deter Pakistan from weaponising terrorism. Performative militarism will only play into the hands of Pakistan’s military elite instead of creating deterrence. Every Indian strike revalidates the Army’s primacy in Pakistan’s national security. It helps Islamabad justify deeper integration with Beijing and provides Pakistan’s military a useful external ‘threat’ to deflect attention from domestic economic crises.
The ‘war’ in May was not fought on conventional fronts — it was a digital war, a propaganda war, a war of perceptions. Pakistan claimed victory early, its assertions were reinforced by Chinese media and amplified by a global audience increasingly sceptical of Modi’s muscular posturing.
The United States, during Donald Trump’s second presidency, has added to India’s discomfort. Far from standing with New Delhi, Trump continues to hyphenate India and Pakistan in public statements while congratulating himself for brokering a ceasefire. India has found itself alarmingly isolated, as Russia, once India’s strategic bedrock, has tilted further towards China. Even Quad allies like Japan and Australia have issued generic calls for restraint.
This diplomatic isolation is not accidental; it is the consequence of a decade-long foreign policy that often confused statecraft with grandstanding. India has failed to internationalise Pakistan’s role in transnational terrorism in a compelling, fact-based manner. It has neglected its leadership position in forums like the Non-Aligned Movement and the G-77, opting instead to play second fiddle to Washington while alienating traditional allies in the Global South.
This is where a return to diplomacy offers both realism and long-term leverage. Dr Manmohan Singh’s doctrine in the aftermath of the 2008 Mumbai attacks offers a useful model. Under his leadership, India eschewed immediate military retaliation and instead focused on building an airtight case against Pakistan’s involvement, working through INTERPOL, FATF and the UN Security Council to tighten the noose diplomatically and economically.
Today, a revitalised version of that strategy is even more critical. The Financial Action Task Force (FATF), which had recently monitored Pakistan’s progress on anti-terror financing, must be re-engaged with fresh intelligence and persistent lobbying. India should document the direct link between Pakistan’s ISI and groups active in Bangladesh, Afghanistan and Kashmir, and use this dossier in multilateral institutions where Beijing’s veto cannot silence the facts.
India must lead a global coalition of countries impacted by Pakistan-exported terrorism, ranging from Iran to Afghanistan’s Taliban government to even Saudi Arabia. By re-framing Pakistan as not just India’s problem but as a global enabler of extremism, New Delhi can pressure Islamabad where it hurts: foreign aid, trade access and credit ratings.
New Delhi must also harness its economic power. India is the world’s fourth largest economy and has far more to offer the Global South than Pakistan. Through preferential trade agreements, digital infrastructure support and climate resilience aid, India can rebuild lost influence in the neighbourhood, from Bangladesh to Sri Lanka, countering Pakistan–China outreach by offering credible and democratic alternatives.
Equally, India must stop ignoring China’s role in Pakistan’s defence resurgence. Beijing’s strategic silence, its military assistance to Islamabad, and its use of Pakistan as a testing ground for its military-industrial complex must be called out, not through sabre-rattling but through legal and diplomatic channels.
India should file formal complaints to multilateral institutions about Chinese weapon systems being used against a fellow member state, investigate violations of arms control norms, and expose the dual-use nature of CPEC (China–Pakistan Economic Corridor) infrastructure in global forums. The narrative must shift from China’s ‘peaceful rise’ to its enabling of state-sponsored proxy warfare in South Asia.
Domestically too, India must recalibrate the messaging — military restraint does not imply weakness; it signals strategic maturity. The Indian public must be told that statecraft, not airstrikes, is how great powers deal with chronic threats. Instead of theatrical claims about “teaching Pakistan a lesson”, India must demonstrate how it is shaping the battlefield of global opinion, economic pressure and international legitimacy.
The China–Pakistan nexus is real, growing and aimed at boxing India into a two-front security dilemma. But it is not invincible. Pakistan remains economically fragile, politically unstable and diplomatically suspect. China’s global image is suffering, its economy shows signs of slowing, and its BRI (Belt and Road Initiative) is facing increasing resistance. India must exploit these fissures, not through military spectacle, but through sustained, methodical diplomacy.
In 2025, India stands at a crossroads. It can continue down the path of rhetorical escalation, which plays to the advantage of its adversaries, or it can pursue a long-term strategy grounded in diplomacy, international law and global alliances, a strategy that might restore its credibility and global standing. Instead of noisy bravado, India must speak softly and carry the big stick of global diplomatic consensus.
Views are personal
Ashok Swain is a professor of peace and conflict research at Uppsala University, Sweden. More of his writing may be