Meddle east meditations: India and countries like Pakistan are inactive and active for safety of their citizens and economies
Domestic discourse on the latest Gulf War took a puzzling turn this past week. Has Islamabad re-established its strategic weight? Should India have taken on the role of peacemaker and mediator? The questions are silly and reductionist. They flow from an all-weather obsession with Pakistan.
They also mis-appreciate the primary purpose of foreign policy: sheltering of one's own citizens and economy. This is what all countries troubled by the conflict are attempting to do. Even mediation is only resorted to if it serves this objective, not otherwise.
For Narendra Modi, managing India's immediate energy security and preventing Indian assets from being targeted in any military escalation are key priorities. In this, at least so far, GoI's diplomacy has met reasonable success. The good luck may not last. But it will not be for want of effort.
Also Read: The war with Iran may be ushering in a new nuclear age
Pakistan is trying to achieve the same goals for its people. So are several other affected countries across Asia and the Indo-Pacific, from the gates of Europe to the Philippines and Australia. Structural disruption in energy and fertiliser supplies, inflation surges and an incalculable growth shock are widespread fears. Collectively, these will take a toll on the 2026-27 business year.
Further down, rebuilding regional and global economies might well take us into the early 2030s. With its multiple crises, from the pandemic onwards, future historians could interpret the 2020s as a lost decade for the world economy. That is the enormity of what we face. In the circumstances, India and Pakistan are hardly each other's problem.
Where is the conflict situated? Nobody is certain of the floor. There are countervailing interests and, therefore, pressures on Donald Trump. Gulf states have become frontline targets. A reckless US-Israel intervention has jeopardised Gulf countries' modernisation programme. It has shaken an economic model focused on urbanisation and connectivity, innovation, technology, financial services, and a welcoming tourism and expat experience. It has left Iran more relevant as a coercive actor.
Also Read: Mediators gather in Pakistan for talks on ending the month long Israel-Iran war
Any post-conflict scenario will require greater military and internal security spending by Gulf states. They will also be vulnerable to different types of Iranian influence ops. Bahrain, for instance, is a Shia country with a Sunni monarch. Along with the UAE and Saudi Arabia, it's urging Trump to 'finish what you started'. In real terms this means freeing the Strait of Hormuz from an Iranian chokehold.
This, in turn, would involve not just a US assault on one or more islands off Iran's southern coast, but perhaps a longer-term occupation, even if eventually under a multinational rubric. How would this square with Trump's 'stay home' commitment to his MAGA base?
To be fair, it's not as if Gulf states are blind to Iran's enhanced importance. This is a reality. Nuisance value is the ultimate leverage in global politics. As regional economies are reconstructed, accommodation and incentivisation of Iran is inevitable. Gulf states would only want more cards in their hands when this process begins.
Other countries are nudging Trump differently. Pakistan, Turkiye, Egypt and Saudi Arabia - with the first hosting the other three in a 2-day foreign ministerial talks in Islamabad to de-escalate the US-Israel war on Iran - are working towards a frozen outcome, with Iranian capabilities more intact than Gulf states would want. Their imperatives, too, would appear legitimate.
These three countries have among the most professional militaries in the Muslim world. They are wary of being drawn into an expanding unrest. Pakistan, for example, has a security pact with Saudi Arabia. Understandably, it does not want this invoked. Or to get into war with Iran on somebody else's behalf.
An Iran that's fragmented, or where the theocratic government doesn't hold, is also a concern. This will likely lead to Kurdish and Baloch insurgencies that could spill over to Turkiye and Pakistan respectively. Further, Islamabad, Ankara and Cairo - as well as Teheran - are all potential losers should GCC-centric geo-economic and connectivity mega-projects advance.
India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEEC) is a challenge to all of them, and the setback it has suffered has been noted. To that end, any continued pressure that constricts Gulf economies' ambitions and salience is useful. When, and at which point, on the graph the X axis of Iran's military degradation (on Gulf states' wish list) will meet the Y axis of Iran's political destabilisation (mediator states' nightmare) will determine the region's course.
Finally, there's Israel. Will it stop fighting even if the others do? Notwithstanding a busy and industrious bilateral corridor, India's and Israel's regional strategies are diverging. Trade, multi-modal connectivity endeavours and a calibrated economic normalisation that finesses politics: Israel is not buying into this template. It has doubled down on containment.
Given its moves in Lebanon and Syria, it's exploring territorial expansionism as a security buffer. The likelihood - or risk - of new political maps in West Asia is at its highest in decades.
Given all this, India needs to protect its flanks, be mindful of its strategic equities in Gulf states, and its working relationships with almost all stakeholders. Modi has wisely recognised this is a time for caution and, to the extent possible, for shielding the national economy. It is not a moment for adventurism. Masterly inactivity is a storied diplomatic tradition. It has its merits today.
(Disclaimer: The opinions expressed in this column are that of the writer. The facts and opinions expressed here do not reflect the views of www.economictimes.com)
They also mis-appreciate the primary purpose of foreign policy: sheltering of one's own citizens and economy. This is what all countries troubled by the conflict are attempting to do. Even mediation is only resorted to if it serves this objective, not otherwise.
For Narendra Modi, managing India's immediate energy security and preventing Indian assets from being targeted in any military escalation are key priorities. In this, at least so far, GoI's diplomacy has met reasonable success. The good luck may not last. But it will not be for want of effort.
Also Read: The war with Iran may be ushering in a new nuclear age
Pakistan is trying to achieve the same goals for its people. So are several other affected countries across Asia and the Indo-Pacific, from the gates of Europe to the Philippines and Australia. Structural disruption in energy and fertiliser supplies, inflation surges and an incalculable growth shock are widespread fears. Collectively, these will take a toll on the 2026-27 business year.
Further down, rebuilding regional and global economies might well take us into the early 2030s. With its multiple crises, from the pandemic onwards, future historians could interpret the 2020s as a lost decade for the world economy. That is the enormity of what we face. In the circumstances, India and Pakistan are hardly each other's problem.
Where is the conflict situated? Nobody is certain of the floor. There are countervailing interests and, therefore, pressures on Donald Trump. Gulf states have become frontline targets. A reckless US-Israel intervention has jeopardised Gulf countries' modernisation programme. It has shaken an economic model focused on urbanisation and connectivity, innovation, technology, financial services, and a welcoming tourism and expat experience. It has left Iran more relevant as a coercive actor.
Also Read: Mediators gather in Pakistan for talks on ending the month long Israel-Iran war
Any post-conflict scenario will require greater military and internal security spending by Gulf states. They will also be vulnerable to different types of Iranian influence ops. Bahrain, for instance, is a Shia country with a Sunni monarch. Along with the UAE and Saudi Arabia, it's urging Trump to 'finish what you started'. In real terms this means freeing the Strait of Hormuz from an Iranian chokehold.
This, in turn, would involve not just a US assault on one or more islands off Iran's southern coast, but perhaps a longer-term occupation, even if eventually under a multinational rubric. How would this square with Trump's 'stay home' commitment to his MAGA base?
To be fair, it's not as if Gulf states are blind to Iran's enhanced importance. This is a reality. Nuisance value is the ultimate leverage in global politics. As regional economies are reconstructed, accommodation and incentivisation of Iran is inevitable. Gulf states would only want more cards in their hands when this process begins.
Other countries are nudging Trump differently. Pakistan, Turkiye, Egypt and Saudi Arabia - with the first hosting the other three in a 2-day foreign ministerial talks in Islamabad to de-escalate the US-Israel war on Iran - are working towards a frozen outcome, with Iranian capabilities more intact than Gulf states would want. Their imperatives, too, would appear legitimate.
These three countries have among the most professional militaries in the Muslim world. They are wary of being drawn into an expanding unrest. Pakistan, for example, has a security pact with Saudi Arabia. Understandably, it does not want this invoked. Or to get into war with Iran on somebody else's behalf.
An Iran that's fragmented, or where the theocratic government doesn't hold, is also a concern. This will likely lead to Kurdish and Baloch insurgencies that could spill over to Turkiye and Pakistan respectively. Further, Islamabad, Ankara and Cairo - as well as Teheran - are all potential losers should GCC-centric geo-economic and connectivity mega-projects advance.
India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEEC) is a challenge to all of them, and the setback it has suffered has been noted. To that end, any continued pressure that constricts Gulf economies' ambitions and salience is useful. When, and at which point, on the graph the X axis of Iran's military degradation (on Gulf states' wish list) will meet the Y axis of Iran's political destabilisation (mediator states' nightmare) will determine the region's course.
Finally, there's Israel. Will it stop fighting even if the others do? Notwithstanding a busy and industrious bilateral corridor, India's and Israel's regional strategies are diverging. Trade, multi-modal connectivity endeavours and a calibrated economic normalisation that finesses politics: Israel is not buying into this template. It has doubled down on containment.
Given its moves in Lebanon and Syria, it's exploring territorial expansionism as a security buffer. The likelihood - or risk - of new political maps in West Asia is at its highest in decades.
Given all this, India needs to protect its flanks, be mindful of its strategic equities in Gulf states, and its working relationships with almost all stakeholders. Modi has wisely recognised this is a time for caution and, to the extent possible, for shielding the national economy. It is not a moment for adventurism. Masterly inactivity is a storied diplomatic tradition. It has its merits today.
(Disclaimer: The opinions expressed in this column are that of the writer. The facts and opinions expressed here do not reflect the views of www.economictimes.com)
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